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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW—THE CASE OF 
CAMARGO AND THE CONUNDRUM OF DEFINING WORKER 
STATUS UNDER MASSACHUSETTS WORKPLACE LAWS 
Victoria Arend Carbone* 
A worker’s status as an “employee” or “independent contractor” 
determines the amount of protection she will receive under a vast array 
of workplace laws.  However, the definitions of “employee” and 
“independent contractor” are increasingly misapplied in today’s labor 
market.  The resulting worker misclassification is a widely recognized 
problem that prevents workers from knowing and asserting their rights.  
Incongruous statutory standards for defining worker status exacerbate 
worker misclassification.  In Ives Camargo’s Case, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court contended with such incongruities in a decision 
that determined the correct standard for defining who is an “employee” 
and “independent contractor” under Massachusetts workers’ 
compensation law.  The court’s holding affirmed the Commonwealth’s 
current definitional system for worker status in which, paradoxically, 
“the same worker can be an employee for one purpose but an 
independent contractor for another.”1  This Note will argue that the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court missed an opportunity in 
Camargo to clarify the incongruous standards used to define worker 
status in Massachusetts.  In the wake of Camargo, this Note calls for a 
uniform definition of “independent contractor” across the 
Commonwealth’s workplace laws. 
 
* Candidate for J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2020; M.A., 
University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2014; B.A., Bennington College, 2010. I would like to 
thank Professor Harris Freeman for his mentorship throughout the writing of this Note. I would 
also like to extend my thanks to the staff of the Western New England Law Review for their 
tireless efforts in preparing this piece for publication. Finally, to my mom, Mary, and my 
husband, Nick—thank you for your unending love, patience, and support. 
1. Ives Camargo’s Case, 96 N.E.3d 673, 682 (Mass. 2018) (Gants, C.J., concurring). 
 
260 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:259 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Ives Camargo worked as a newspaper delivery person.  Between 2001 
and 2012, Camargo delivered newspapers for Publishers Circulation 
Fulfillment (PCF),2 a company that provides delivery services to print 
media publishers.3  These publishers contract with PCF to provide “final 
mile” distribution services to their customers.4  PCF, in turn, hires 
“delivery providers,”5 like Camargo, to deliver the newspapers and 
magazines to subscribers’ homes.6  
During the course of her employment as a delivery agent with PCF, 
Camargo signed various contractual agreements identifying herself as an 
independent contractor.7  Camargo made deliveries on a self-determined 
schedule and used her own vehicle to complete her route.8  She purchased 
independent contractor work insurance, and filed taxes as an independent 
contractor.9  Camargo felt compelled to sign the agreements in order to 
keep her job and so she signed them.10  Furthermore, because of the nature 
of the work Camargo performed for PCF—given that the deliveries she 
made were arguably central to their business—she considered herself a 
PCF employee.11 
Camargo likely did not think much about her employment status until 
she was injured on the job.  During the course of her employment, 
Camargo was injured in two separate accidents while completing her 
delivery routes, both of which she reported to PCF.12  After the second 
injury, PCF terminated Camargo,13 who subsequently filed a workers’ 
compensation claim with the Massachusetts Department of Industrial 
 
2. Id. at 675–76. 
3. About PCF, PCF, http://pcfcorp.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/TX49-3ENF]. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Michael C. Duff, More Independent Contractor Confusion: A New Massachusetts 
Workers’ Compensation Decision, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW PROF BLOG (May 11, 
2018), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/workerscomplaw/2018/05/more-independent-
contractor-confusion-a-new-massachusetts-workers-compensation-decision.html. 
7. Camargo, 96 N.E.3d at 675. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Ives Camargo, 30 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. 311, 2016 WL 7335381, at *1 (Mass. 
Dep’t Indus. Accidents Dec. 9, 2016). 
11. Camargo, 96 N.E.3d at 675; see also Camargo, 2016 WL 7335381, at *3. 
12. Camargo, 96 N.E.3d at 675–76. 
13. Id. at 676. 
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Accidents (DIA),14 the state agency charged with overseeing the 
Commonwealth’s workers’ compensation system.15 
At an initial hearing, the DIA found that Camargo was not an 
“employee” as defined by chapter 152 of the Massachusetts General 
Laws, the workers’ compensation statute,16 and the MacTavish-Whitman 
test17—a twelve-factor common law test adopted by the agency to 
determine which workers are covered employees under Massachusetts 
workers’ compensation law.  The DIA denied Camargo’s claim on the 
grounds that Camargo was an independent contractor, not an employee, 
of PCF.18  On appeal to the DIA Reviewing Board (Board), Camargo 
argued that the DIA hearing officer had used the incorrect standard to 
define her employment status.  Instead of chapter 152 and the MacTavish-
Whitman test, Camargo argued that her status must be defined under 
section 148B of chapter 149, the Massachusetts independent contractor 
statute.  Camargo asserted that because the language of section 148B 
contained a reference to chapter 152, and therefore necessarily 
incorporated it,19 Camargo claimed that she was a “covered employee” 
under section 148B.20  The Board was not convinced by this argument and 
affirmed the DIA’s initial decision.21  Camargo appealed to the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), arguing again that the 
wrong standard had been used to determine her employment status.22 
In Ives Camargo’s Case,23 the SJC was asked to resolve a statutory 
ambiguity concerning the definition of “employee” and “independent 
contractor” under Massachusetts workers’ compensation law.24  The court 
scrutinized two definitions: chapter 149, section 148B, of the 
Massachusetts General Laws (defining “independent contractor” under 
 
14. Id. at 675. 
15. Department of Industrial Accidents, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/
orgs/department-of-industrial-accidents [https://perma.cc/4M3L-YZHD]. 
16. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 152, § 1 (2019). 
17. Whitman’s Case, 952 N.E.2d 983 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011); MacTavish v. O’Connor 
Lumber Co., 6 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. 174, 1992 WL 253660 (Mass. Dep’t Indus. 
Accidents 1992). 
18. Ives Camargo, 30 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. 311, 2016 WL 7335381, at *3 (Mass. 
Dep’t Indus. Acc. Dec. 9, 2016). 
19. Id. at 6. 
20. Camargo, 96 N.E.3d at 675 (Mass. 2018). 
21. Ives Camargo, 2016 WL 7335381, at *3. 
22. Id. 
23. Camargo, 96 N.E.3d at 675. 
24. Id. 
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wage and hour and unemployment law);25 and chapter 152 (defining 
“employee” for the purposes of workers’ compensation),26 which the DIA 
interpreted by applying the twelve-factor MacTavish-Whitman test.27  The 
definition under section 148B is an “ABC” test for employment status—
a simple, three-factor test that creates a presumption of employee status 
and is more protective of workers than other standards.28  The statutory 
definition under chapter 152 combined with the MacTavish-Whitman 
factors form a common law control test, assessing the amount of control 
an employer exercises over a worker.29 
This dispute over how to define “employee” and “independent 
contractor” is not a new one, particularly in the area of workers’ 
compensation.30  Yet given the complexities of the employment 
relationship, especially as it has evolved in recent years, the matter 
remains unsettled.31  Camargo posed to the SJC a novel question of 
statutory interpretation regarding the age-old distinction between 
“employee” and “independent contractor,”32 challenging the court to 
investigate the incongruities of the Commonwealth’s approach to defining 
worker status. 
Camargo thus presented the SJC with an opportunity to critically 
analyze the inconsistencies of Massachusetts workplace laws that confuse 
questions of worker status and thus increase the likelihood of 
misclassification in the Commonwealth.  Instead of seizing this 
opportunity, the SJC deferred to agency judgment and carried out a 
cursory analysis of the two statutes at issue.33  The majority’s opinion did 
not fully address the practical problems of such a system, merely 
explaining that the “lack of uniformity [] reflects differences in the 
 
25. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B (2019). 
26. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 152, § 1 (2019). 
27. See Whitman’s Case, 952 N.E.2d 983 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011); MacTavish v. 
O’Connor Lumber Co., 6 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. 174, 1992 WL 253660 (Mass. Dep’t 
Indus. Accidents 1992). 
28. See Athol Daily News v. Bd. of Rev. of Div. of Emp. & Training, 786 N.E.2d 365, 
370–71 (Mass. 2003); infra Section I.B.3. 
29. See Ives Camargo’s Case, 96 N.E.3d 673, 683 n.3 (Mass. 2018); infra Section I.B.1. 
30. See MacTavish, 6 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. at 177 (“The issue of who is an 
independent contractor and who is an employee has bedeviled the bar and bench since the 
beginning of workers’ compensation.”). 
31. ROSA J. CHO ET AL., INT’L CTR. FOR RES. ON WOMEN, INDEPENDENT WORKERS AND 
THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 4–5, https://www.icrw.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
Independent-Workers-and-the-Changing-Workforce-pdf.pdf (2016) [https://perma.cc/7J4P-
8T4Q]. 
32. Camargo, 96 N.E.3d at 675. 
33. Id. at 678–680. 
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particular laws.”34  The court held that the definition of independent 
contractor under section 148B does not apply in the context of a workers’ 
compensation claim, despite a reference to chapter 152 contained 
therein.35  In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Gants, joined by Justices 
Lowy and Budd, advocated for the Massachusetts legislature to take a 
more coherent approach to defining worker status.36  On the whole, the 
decision overlooks the impact judicial action could have had. 
Camargo exemplifies the definitional conundrum facing workers and 
employers across the country that is posed by a “patchwork of different 
standards for determining whether a worker is an employee or an 
independent contractor.”37  The SJC declined to take judicial 
responsibility for a judicially solvable problem in Camargo—a decision 
that will likely have a detrimental impact on Massachusetts workers.  This 
Note will argue that the SJC missed an opportunity in Camargo to clarify 
the Commonwealth’s inconsistent standards for defining who is an 
independent contractor under Massachusetts workplace laws, further 
obfuscating those laws’ remedial intent and increasing the likelihood of 
worker misclassification.  In the wake of Camargo, this Note calls for a 
common standard for defining “independent contractor” across the 
Commonwealth’s workplace laws. 
To demonstrate the necessity of such change, Part I will discuss the 
how incongruous definitional standards for worker status increase the 
threat of worker misclassification, identify the primary tests used to define 
employment status, and review the definitional standards at issue in 
Camargo.  Part II will analyze the majority’s reasoning and the concurring 
opinion in Camargo.  Part III will investigate the benefits and challenges 
of adopting a coherent approach to defining worker status, considering the 
example of Maine, which uses a common definitional standard.  
Furthermore, Part III will propose that a uniform definition of 
“independent contractor” under the ABC test of section 148B be applied 
consistently across Massachusetts workplace laws. 
I. “EMPLOYEE” AND “INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR”—AN 
 
34. Id. at 680. 
35. Id. at 681. 
36. Id. at 683. 
37. Id. at 681. 
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AMBIGUOUS DISTINCTION, A PLURALITY OF STANDARDS 
Today’s workers and employers struggle to understand their 
relationship with, and obligations to, one another.38  In recent years, as the 
nature of work has changed drastically,39 so, too, has the traditional 
employment relationship—a transformation indicative of the evolving 
nature of work and the workplace.40  Employers rely less on permanent, 
full-time employees, and more on contingent, part-time workers and 
independent contractors,41 “shedding direct employment”42 in favor of 
what David Weil describes as a “fissured workplace,”43 where the 
relationship between workers and employers has become more opaque.44 
“The modern employment relationship bears little resemblance to that 
assumed in our core workplace regulations.”45  This makes it difficult for 
labor market participants to know their status and to follow the evolving 
legal definitions of worker and employer.46  The problem is rooted in the 
workplace laws that govern the employment relationship.47  Unclear and 
inconsistent standards for defining worker status remain a formidable 
obstacle to preventing misclassification.48  In particular, inconsistent 
definitions of who is a covered “employee” and who is an “independent 
contractor” pose significant challenges49 to the courts and agencies tasked 
with interpreting them. 
 
38. See CATHERINE RUCKELSHAUS ET AL., NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WHO’S THE 
BOSS: RESTORING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR LABOR STANDARDS IN OUTSOURCED WORK 1, 3 
(2014), https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Whos-the-Boss-Restoring-
Accountability-Labor-Standards-Outsourced-Work-Report.pdf. 
39. DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO 
MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 7 (2014). 
40. Id. at 7–9. 
41. CHO ET AL., supra note 31, at 1–2. 
42. WEIL, supra note 39, at 4.  These changes have resulted in a “fundamental 
restructuring of employment in many parts of the economy.”  Id. at 3. 
43. Id. at 183. 
44. Id. at 7.  “The modern workplace has been profoundly transformed.  Employment is 
no longer the clear relationship between a well-defined employer and a worker. . . .  Like a rock 
with a fracture that deepens and spreads with time, the workplace over the past three decades 
has fissured.”  Id. 
45. Id. at 183. 
46. See Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and Quasi-employers: An 
Analysis of Employees and Employers Who Operate in the Borderland Between an Employer-
and-Employee Relationship, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 605, 612–13 (2012). 
47. Id.. 
48. Id. at 613. 
49. Christopher Buscaglia, Crafting a Legislative Solution to the Economic Harm of 
Employee Misclassification, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 111, 119 (2009). 
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Such incongruities inherent to a “patchwork”50 system for defining 
employment status were at the heart of Camargo.51  This Part of the Note 
will discuss the extent to which inconsistent standards for defining who is 
an “employee” and “independent contractor” aggravate the problem of 
worker misclassification; the principal standards used by legislatures, 
courts, and administrative agencies to define employment status; and 
finally, the definitional standards at issue in Camargo. 
A. The Menace of Misclassification 
When an employee is misclassified as an independent contractor, the 
effect is far more than semantic.52  Classification as an employee gives a 
worker access to a set of legal protections and benefits in the workplace.53  
Misclassification as an independent contractor causes workers to lose 
income, important benefits—such as those conferred by the workers’ and 
unemployment compensation systems—and legal protections guaranteed 
to employees, including safeguards against employer discrimination, and 
the right to unionize and collectively bargain.54  By preventing access to 
 
50. Ives Camargo’s Case, 96 N.E.3d 673, 682 (Mass. 2018). 
51. See generally id. 
52. See Sarah Leberstein & Catherine Ruckelshaus, Independent Contractor vs. 
Employee: Why Misclassification Matters and What We Can Do To Stop It, NAT’L EMP’T LAW 
PROJECT 3–4 (May 2016), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Policy-Brief-
Independent-Contractor-vs-Employee.pdf.  Federal, state, and local governments also 
experience the burden of misclassification, losing millions of dollars in revenue as a result of 
unpaid payroll taxes, and decreased employer contribution to unemployment and workers’ 
compensation funds.  Id. at 4.  Employers also lose out, as those who properly classify workers 
are unfairly burdened due to the other employers’ opportunistic application of 
employee/independent contractor statutes.  Id.  See also Buscaglia, supra note 49, at 111–12. 
53. Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 661, 666–67 (2013); Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing, ABC on the Books and in 
the Courts: An Analysis of Recent Independent Contractor and Misclassification Statutes, 18 U. 
PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 53, 61 (2015); Naomi B. Sunshine, Employees as Price-Takers, 22 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 105, 115–16 (2018).  A number of protections afforded by workplace 
laws are available only to employees and not to independent contractors or other categories of 
workers: 
Prohibitions against race, sex, age, and disability discrimination, below-minimum 
wages, dangerous working conditions, retirement funding requirements, and 
attacks on collective activity, among others, are limited to employees.  State 
employment provisions such as workers’ compensation and unemployment 
compensation are also limited to employees.  These statutory schemes are designed 
to provide protections to employees as employees and not to any other groups, 
even if those outside the employee category might benefit from the scheme. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
54. Leberstein & Ruckelshaus, supra note 52, at 3. 
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the protections workplace laws were designed to confer, misclassification 
creates a broad class of vulnerable labor market participants.55 
While instances of misclassification proliferate in particular 
industries, including home care, transportation, and the “on-demand” or 
“gig” economy, the problem is pervasive, its scope likely more vast than 
current data reflects.56  Misclassification has a cross-sectional reach that 
knows no geographical bounds, crossing state lines, and impacting 
workers in every corner of the nation.57  Many employers, motivated by 
economic incentives to save money58 and avoid liability,59 take advantage 
of a shifting labor landscape and increasingly misclassify workers.60 
The federal government has taken considerable steps to combat 
misclassification in the last decade.61  But states have played an even more 
critical enforcement role in seeking to hold employers accountable.62  
Notably, Massachusetts was one of the first states to focus on the 
problem,63 crafting legislation to target misclassification64 and 
 
55. See Jenna Amato Moran, Independent Contractor or Employee? Misclassification of 
Workers and Its Effect on the State, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 105, 121–22 (2009–2010). 
56. See Catherine Ruckelshaus & Ceilidh Gao, Independent Contractor Misclassification 
Imposes Huge Costs on Workers and Federal and State Treasuries, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT 
1–2 (Sept. 2017), https://www.nelp.org/publication/independent-contractor-misclassification-
imposes-huge-costs-on-workers-and-federal-and-state-treasuries-update-2017/ 
[https://perma.cc/SXK2-RDPQ]. 
57. Leberstein & Ruckelshaus, supra note 52, at 1. 
58. See Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Rethinking the Worker Classification Test: Employees, 
Entrepreneurship, and Empowerment, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 67, 71–72 (2013). 
59. V.B. Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker 
Identities, 105 CAL. L. REV. 65, 79 (2017) (“[T]he vagueness of worker categorization tests 
incentivizes employers to drive a greater number of their workers into a zone of ambiguity, 
thereby lowering employers’ financial and legal risks.”); Pivateau, supra note 58, at 71–72. 
60. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the 
Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1681 (2016); Ruckelshaus & Gao, supra note 56, at 
1. 
61. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WORKING FOR YOU: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
2009– 2016 6 (2016), https://web.archive.org/web/20190702204638/https://www.dol.gov/
sites/default/files/WorkingForYou-2009-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/VV5U-XU9P]; see also 
Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 53, at 62 (“Simultaneous to local misclassification 
legislating and enforcement, federal enforcement has expended, led primarily by the 
Department of Labor (DOL) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).”). 
62. See Moran, supra note 55, at 105.  See generally Adam H. Miller, Curbing Worker 
Misclassification in Vermont: Proposed State Actions to Improve a National Problem, 39 VT. 
L. REV. 207 (2014). 
63. Jason M. Goldstein, Money Under the Bridge: The Worker Misclassification 
Problem, 5 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 107, 125, 127 (2009). 
64. Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 53, at 65 (discussing legislative amendments 
to the Massachusetts independent contractor statute that incorporated the ABC test—a worker-
protective standard creating a presumption of employment). 
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establishing a task force to combat “the underground economy and 
employee misclassification.”65 
Efforts to combat misclassification do not address a major obstacle: 
a plurality of definitional standards used to define worker status.  In 
general, “[m]ost employment laws in the United States at the state and 
federal level define ‘employee’ according to stated objectives of the 
individual statute.  This has led to varied—and highly contested—debates 
on who is or is not an employee.”66  Numerous definitions of “employee” 
and “independent contractor” proliferate, laid out by various federal and 
state statutes.67  Additionally, states use discrete definitions for different 
areas of work laws.68  Consequently, numerous definitions of “employee” 
and “independent contractor” are used within the same state—one 
definition applying to workers’ compensation, another to unemployment 
insurance, and yet another to wage and hour laws.69  Furthermore, courts 
and administrative agencies tasked with interpretation and enforcement 
seek to clarify the meaning of these statutes,70 often crafting common law 
tests to be interpreted alongside existing statutory language.71  The result 
 
65. COUNCIL ON THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY, ANNUAL REPORT 2015 3 (2015), 
https://www.mass.gov/files/2017-07/cue-annual-report-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q86F-
GF4Z].  Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healy has also highlighted the significance of 
the problem. Press Release, Office of Attorney Gen. Maura Healey, AG Healey Leads 
Multistate Effort to Curb Misclassification of Workers (Apr. 30, 2018), 
https://www.mass.gov/news/ag-healey-leads-multistate-effort-to-curb-misclassification-of-
workers.  In April 2018, Attorney General Healey joined in a coalition of twelve state attorneys 
general to file an amicus brief in an action before the National Labor Relations Board to support 
a finding that the purposeful misclassification of workers as independent contractors can 
constitute an unfair labor practice.  Brief of the States of Mass. et al. as Amici Curiae, in Support 
of the General Counsel’s Request to Affirm the Administrative Law Judge’s Decision at 2, 
Velox Express, Inc. v. Edge, (2018) (No. 15-CA-184006), https://www.mass.gov/
files/documents/2018/04/30/Amici%20States%20Brief%20Velox%204-30-18.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8792-L49H].  The amici argued that “[m]isclassification not only denies 
workers the most basic statutory protections, such as the right to be paid minimum wage and to 
be paid on time, but it also contravenes their right to organize for better pay and working 
conditions,” among other rights.  Id. at 2–3. 
66. WEIL, supra note 39, at 20–21. 
67. See Dubal, supra note 59, at 71–73; Goldstein, supra note 63, at 109–15; Rubinstein, 
supra note 46, at 612–625. 
68. See infra Section I.B. 
69. See generally Moran, supra note 55 (discussing the impact of conflicting worker 
classification standards on New York state). 
70. Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and 
How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 298 (2001) (“The real work 
of identifying ‘employees’ and their employment relationships has always been in the courts.”). 
71. See, e.g., MacTavish v. O’Connor Lumber Co., 6 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. 174, 
1992 WL 253660 (Mass. Dep’t Indus. Accidents 1992). 
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of this impracticable approach is “an ever-expanding catalogue of 
‘factors’” creating an unwieldy “multi-factored analysis [which] becomes 
more complex and its outcome less predictable.”72  Ultimately, “the lack 
of statutory and judicial clarity has contributed to the problem of 
misclassification.”73  These inconsistent standards have created significant 
confusion, frustrating efforts to properly classify workers.74 
B. Principal Standards for Defining “Employee” and “Independent 
Contractor” 
Three main tests define employment status:75 the common law control 
test, the economic realities test, and the ABC test, or variations thereof.76  
Each of these tests, traditionally used in distinct areas of workplace law,77 
focuses on different aspects of the employment relationship to reach a 
definition of who is a covered “employee” and who is not.78 
1. Control Test  
Under the common law control test, the amount of control exerted by 
an employer over a worker is paramount to determining whether a worker 
is an employee or independent contractor.79  The test is founded on tort 
principles found in the Second Restatement of Agency. 80  The test is 
aimed at ascertaining the circumstances under which an employer is liable 
for the actions of someone in her employ.  In this way, “employment is 
used as the basic dividing line in the doctrine of respondeat superior”81 to 
determine whether an agency relationship, and the resulting employer 
liability, exists.  Forms vary, but the test usually includes a list of non-
dispositive factors weighed alongside one another to assess the amount of 
 
72. Id. at 299. 
73. Rubinstein, supra note 46, at 613. 
74. See Buscaglia, supra note 49, at 127. 
75. Dubal, supra note 59, at 72 (providing a useful comparison of the different tests, 
identifying the dispositive factors of each and the employment protections or benefits with 
which they are associated). 
76. Id. 
77. Moran, supra note 55, at 107–08. 
78. Dubal, supra note 59, at 72. 
79. Brigham’s Case, 202 N.E.2d 597, 598 (Mass. 1964). 
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958) (defining an employee, or 
“servant,” as “a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with 
respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other’s control 
or right to control.”); see John A. Pearce II & Jonathan P. Silva, The Future of Independent 
Contractors and Their Status as Non-Employees: Moving on From a Common Law Standard, 
14 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 28 (2018). 
81. Bodie, supra note 53, at 668. 
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control exercised by the employer in a given employment relationship.82  
A form of the control test is used in a number of federal statutes to define 
employment status, including the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 
(NLRA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act.83  State workers’ compensation laws 
also define employment status using a form of the control test.84 
The Supreme Court highlighted the limitations of the control test in 
National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, where the 
Supreme Court sought to determine whether unionized newspaper 
delivery boys were considered “employees” under the NLRA.85  The 
Court found, first, that the common law control test was limited; and, 
second, that the legislative intent of the NLRA was a necessary 
consideration in determining the workers’ status. 86  In its analysis, the 
Court highlighted the protective nature of the act,87 finding that employee 
status must be “determined broadly” under the NLRA, and “in doubtful 
situations, by underlying economic facts rather than technically and 
exclusively by previously established legal classifications.”88  This noted 
departure from the control test was later rejected by the Court and the use 
of the test solidified.89 
Despite its prevalence, the control test has significant drawbacks.  
Any single factor of the common law control test can be weighed more 
heavily than the others by courts or agencies.  This renders the test prone 
to producing inconsistent results because of this multifactor analysis.  Two 
recent cases involving the same employer (FedEx) and workers employed 
in the same position (delivery drivers) gave rise to contrary findings under 
the control test: in one, FedEx workers were found to be employees;90 in 
the other, they were deemed independent contractors.91  In FedEx Home 
 
82. See, e.g., MacTavish v. O’Connor Lumber Co., 6 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. 174, 
177, 1992 WL 253660 (Mass. Dep’t Indus. Accidents 1992).  MacTavish borrowed from the 
Second Restatement to create a ten-factor test to assess worker status in workers’ compensation 
claims.  See infra Section I.C.1. 
83. See Dubal, supra note 59, at 72–74. 
84. MacTavish, 6 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. at 177; Brigham, 202 N.E.2d at 598. 
85. N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
86. Id. at 120–21, 136. 
87. Id. at 127–29. 
88. Id. at 129. 
89. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324–25 (1992) (characterizing 
Hearst as “feeble precedent[] for unmooring the term [employee] from the common law.”).  Id. 
at 324.  See also Pearce & Silva, supra note 80, at 6–8. 
90. Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 997 (9th Cir. 2014). 
91. FedEx Home Delivery v. N.L.R.B., 563 F.3d 492, 503 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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Delivery v. National Labor Relations Board, the D.C. Circuit placed a 
greater emphasis on the entrepreneurial opportunity enjoyed by FedEx 
delivery drivers in comparison to the other common law factors, 
concluding that the drivers were independent contractors.92  Conversely, 
in Alexander v. FedEx Ground Packaging System, the Ninth Circuit 
placed significant weight on FedEx’s control of the “manner and means” 
of the work performed by its drivers, ultimately concluding that this 
control demonstrated employee status.93  The FedEx cases demonstrate 
the disadvantages of the control test, whose multifactor analysis sets the 
stage for inconsistent application. 
2. Economic Realities Test 
The economic realities test is more expansive than the common law 
control test and is therefore more protective of workers.94  This test 
focuses on the financial aspects of the employment relationship.  It is used 
under certain federal wage and hour laws, including the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.95  The economic realities test recognizes that “[w]orker 
status is not based on the work itself, but on the financial reality that 
accompanies the work.”96  The test’s objective is to determine whether a 
worker is economically dependent on an employer.97  Factors analyzed 
under the test include the degree of control the employer has over the 
worker, the workers’ opportunity for profit or loss, and the importance of 
the work done to the employer’s business, among others.98  There is an 
overlap between the common law control test and the economic realities 
test; some courts have also used a hybrid form of the two.99 
3. ABC Test 
Similar to the common law control test, the ABC test focuses on the 
aspect of control in the employment relationship.100  The ABC test’s 
analytical framework, however, is much simpler than that of the control 
 
92. Id. at 497. 
93. Alexander, 765 F.3d at 989. 
94. Carlson, supra note 70, at 311. 
95. Pivateau, supra note 58, at 89. 
96. Id. 
97. Speen v. Crown Clothing Corp., 102 F.3d 625, 632 (1st Cir. 1996). 
98. Pivateau, supra note 58, at 90. 
99. Speen, 102 F.3d at 630 (observing that some courts use a test that combines an 
economic realities analysis with a common law control analysis). 
100. Dubal, supra note 59, at 72. 
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test,101 which can be both a strength and a weakness, paradoxically 
flexible and rigid at the same time.102  This test is often used in the context 
of unemployment insurance103 and state wage and hour laws.104  It has also 
“come to dominate reform of independent contracting definition laws,”105 
particularly because it creates a presumption of employment.106 
In general, the ABC test is more protective of workers in that it 
“create[s] a presumption of employee status . . . that shifts the burden of 
proof to an employer to show that an individual is not an employee.”107  
“Although ABC standards differ by state, a common formulation begins 
with the presumption that firms employ the workers whom they hire.”108  
The test encompasses three factors:109 (1) whether the worker is free from 
control or direction in the performance of the work; (2) whether the work 
is done outside the usual course of the company’s business and off the 
premises; and (3) whether the worker is usually considered to operate a 
separate, independent business or trade.110  The presumption of 
“employee” status can only be overcome if these three elements are met.111 
C. Definitions of “Employee” and “Independent Contractor” at Issue 
 
101. Id. 
102. See Ben Davies, Independent Study, Independent Contractor or Employee? A Brief 
Review and Critique of State and Federal Tests to Determine if Workers Should be Classified 
as Independent Contractors or Employees, 31 (Dec. 2, 2018) (made available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3316441) (“[T]he ABC’s three prongs 
allow for flexibility by the courts when applying the test.  This is both a strength and a weakness 
since employee status is easier to find but misapplications and judicial overreach happen more 
often.”). 
103. Id. 
104. WEIL, supra note 39, at 205. 
105. Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 53, at 65. 
106. Pivateau, supra note 58, at 85.  The test’s simplicity has advantages and 
disadvantages: 
Its variance with federal law tests [which] means that workers that fall within the 
federal definition of independent contractors may be considered employees under 
the state law test.  The test involves such a broad scope that it may reach workers 
in areas that are traditionally independent contractors, while at the same time, 
preventing the growth of the employment market. 
Id. 
107. WEIL, supra note 39, at 205. 
108. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Gig-Dependence: Finding the Real Independent 
Contractors of Platform Work, 39 NORTHERN ILL. L. REV. 379, 409 (2019). 
109. Athol Daily News v. Bd. of Review of Div. of Emp. & Training, 786 N.E.2d 365, 
370 (Mass. 2003). 
110. Dubal, supra note 59, at 72. 
111. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 108, at 409. 
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in Camargo 
In Massachusetts, several statutory definitions distinguish employees 
and independent contractors.112  In general, these laws create a strong 
presumption of employee status.113  However, this presumption is not 
universal; its impact is diluted by incongruities in the Commonwealth’s 
statutory scheme.  There are distinct statutory definitions of who is an 
employee under workers’ compensation,114 unemployment insurance,115 
wage and hour,116 and labor and industry standards.117  For the purposes 
of this Note, the discussion will focus solely on the definition of 
“employee” under chapter 152 and the MacTavish-Whitman test, and the 
distinction between “independent contractor” and “employee” in the 
section 148B of chapter 149, at issue in Camargo. 
1. Definition of “Employee” Under Chapter 152 
The question of who is an employee and who is an independent 
contractor under workers’ compensation law has “bedeviled the bar and 
bench”118 in Massachusetts for more than a century.119  Since the 
introduction of the workers’ compensation system, employers have raised 
the independent contractor defense in disputes concerning worker 
status.120  Today under chapter 152,121 an employee is defined as “every 
person in the service of another under any contract of hire,” excepting 
certain specified categories of workers.122  To interpret this standard, 
Massachusetts courts have used a form of the control test to define the 
 
112. Ives Camargo’s Case, 96 N.E.3d 673, 679 (Mass. 2018). 
113. See Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Intern, Inc., 990 N.E.2d 1054, 1067 (Mass. 
2013) (discussing the presumption of employee status under MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, 
§ 148B). 
114. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 152, § 1 (2019). 
115. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151A, § 2 (2019). 
116. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151 (2019). 
117. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149 (2019). 
118. MacTavish v. O’Connor Lumber Co., 6 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. 174, 177, 1992 
WL 253660 (Mass. Dep’t Indus. Accidents 1992). 
119. The Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1911 was a predecessor of the state’s current 
workers’ compensation law.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 152. Original enactment, St. 1911, c.751.  
It established an elective, no-fault system meant to compensate workers for injuries suffered “in 
the course of and arising out of” employment.  In re Madden, 111 N.E. 379, 384 (Mass. 1916). 
120. In re McAllister, 118 N.E. 326, 326 (Mass. 1918). 
121. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 152, § 1(4) (2019). 
122. The exceptions include, but are not limited to, real estate agents, salespeople 
working on commission, taxi drivers, and persons whose employment “is not in the usual course 
of the trade, business, profession or occupation of his employer.”  Id. 
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employment relationship in workers’ compensation disputes123 and to 
determine “whether the employer retained authority to direct and control 
the work, or had given it to the claimant.”124  The right of an employer to 
“direct and control” a worker has thus been central to determining whether 
a worker is a covered employee or independent contractor in 
Massachusetts.125 
In the past twenty-five years, Massachusetts courts have also used a 
common law test developed by the DIA, the agency charged with 
investigating and adjudicating workers’ compensation claims, when 
making determinations about worker status.126  The DIA created the first 
version of this test in MacTavish v. O’Connor,127 adapting a set of ten 
factors from the Second Restatement of Agency: 
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may 
exercise over the details of the work; 
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct 
occupation or business; 
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, 
the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a 
specialist without supervision; 
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the 
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the 
work; 
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed; 
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job.  
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the 
employer; 
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of 
master and servant; and 
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business. 128 
 
123. In re McDermott, 186 N.E. 231, 233 (Mass. 1933). 
124. In re McAllister, 118 N.E. 326, 326 (Mass. 1918). 
125. MacTavish v. O’Connor Lumber Co., 6 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. 174, 177, 1992 
WL 253660 (Mass. Dep’t Indus. Accidents 1992); Whitman’s Case, 952 N.E.2d 983, 988 n.4 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (citing McDermott, 186 N.E. at 232). 
126. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 152, § 2 (2019). 
127. MacTavish, 6 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. at 177 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF AGENCY § 220 (1958)). 
128. Id. 
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The ten-factor MacTavish test was later supplemented by two additional 
factors in Whitman’s Case.129  The MacTavish-Whitman test is an example 
of a right to control test130 and has become central to analysis of worker 
status in Massachusetts workers’ compensation claims.131 
The DIA recognized the challenges of the MacTavish-Whitman test, 
noting that problems arise when there is no clear evidence, the evidence 
is mixed, or there are insufficient facts aligning with the above factors.132  
In such circumstances, the Board concluded that the intent of workers’ 
compensation law must be considered, noting that 
[t]he issue must be addressed in the context of the theory of workers’ 
compensation: that the cost of industrial accidents should be borne by 
the consumer as part of the cost of the product . . . .  [A] worker whose 
services form a regular and continuing part of the employer’s business, 
and whose method of operation is not such an independent business 
that it forms in itself a separate route through which his costs of 
industrial accidents can be channeled, should be found to be an 
employee and not an independent contractor.133 
So even where the multifactor analysis proves challenging in application, 
the DIA notes that the overarching purpose of the workers’ compensation 
system provides guidance in determining whether a worker is an employee 
or independent contractor. 
Most of the workplace laws in the Commonwealth presume workers 
to be employees,134 such as for the purposes of unemployment 
insurance,135 minimum wages and overtime, and for determinations of 
 
129. Whitman’s Case, 952 N.E.2d at 990 n.3 (adding the following two factors to the 
MacTavish analysis: the tax treatment of the workers’ payment; and the right of the worker to 
end the employment relationship without liability). 
130. Infra Section I.B. 
131. Ives Camargo’s Case, 96 N.E.3d 673, 681 (Mass. 2018); Ives Camargo, 30 Mass. 
Workers’ Comp. Rep. 311, 2016 WL 7335381, at *1 (Mass. Dep’t Indus. Accidents Dec. 9, 
2016). 
132. MacTavish, 6 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. at 177–78. 
133. Id. at 178 (citing 1 LARSON WORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 43.50, at 8–10). 
134. Camargo, 96 N.E.3d at 682 (“Under wage and hour, minimum wage, and overtime 
laws, an individual who performs services is presumed to be an employee unless the employer 
can prove that he or she is in fact an independent contractor.  The same holds true for purposes 
of unemployment insurance.  But that presumption disappears in the context of workers’ 
compensation, where the claimant bears the burden to prove his or her entitlement.”).  Id. 
(citations omitted). 
135. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151A, § 2 (2019). 
Service performed by an individual, except in such cases as the context of this 
chapter otherwise requires, shall be deemed to be employment subject to this 
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independent contractor status.136  However, chapter 152 does not create a 
presumption of employee status.137 Rather, workers carry the burden of 
proving their employee status.138 
2. Definition of “Independent Contractor” and “Employee” Under 
Chapter 149, Section 148B 
Under wage and hour law, section 148B139 defines worker status 
using a form of the three-prong ABC test.140  The statute is intended “to 
protect workers by classifying them as employees, and thereby grant them 
the benefits and rights of employment, where the circumstances indicate 
that they are, in fact, employees.”141  In 2004, the Massachusetts 
legislature amended section 148B of chapter 149 so that the language was 
more protective of workers, constituting a “simplified version of the 
common law ‘right to control’ factors with a presumption of employment 
surmountable only by satisfying a three-prong assessment commonly 
referred to as the ‘ABC test.’”142  This simplified test creates a strong 
presumption of employee status143: 
For the purpose of this chapter and chapter 151, an individual 
performing any service, except as authorized under this chapter, shall 
be considered to be an employee under those chapters unless:— 
 
chapter irrespective of whether the common-law relationship of master and servant 
exists, unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the commissioner that— 
(a) such individual has been and will continue to be free from control and direction 
in connection with the performance of such services, both under his contract for 
the performance of service and in fact; and 
(b) such service is performed either outside the usual course of the business for 
which the service is performed or is performed outside of all the places of business 
of the enterprise for which the service is performed; and 
(c) such individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, 
occupation, profession or business of the same nature as that involved in the 
service performed. 
Id.  Cf. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B (2019). 
136. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B (2019) applies to both determinations of status 
for minimum wages and overtime, and for independent contractor status. 
137. See Ives Camargo’s Case, 96 N.E.3d 673, 682 (Mass. 2018). 
138. Connolly’s Case, 668 N.E.2d 378, 380 (Mass. 1996). 
139. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B (2019). 
140. Somers v. Converged Access, Inc., 911 N.E.2d 739, 747 (Mass. 2009). 
141. Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc., 990 N.E.2d 1054, 1066 (Mass. 2013) 
(quoting Taylor v. E. Conn. Operating, Inc., 988 N.E.2d 408 (Mass. 2013)). 
142. Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 53, at 65. 
143. Pearce & Silva, supra note 80, at 28. 
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(1) the individual is free from control and direction in connection with 
the performance of the service, both under his contract for the 
performance of service and in fact; and 
(2) the service is performed outside the usual course of the business 
of the employer; and, 
(3) the individual is customarily engaged in an independently 
established trade, occupation, profession or business of the same 
nature as that involved in the service performed.144 
“[F]ailure to satisfy any prong will result in the individual’s classification 
as an employee.”145  Additionally, the statute imposes a significant penalty 
for worker misclassification under the statute.146 
Under the first prong of the test, a showing that the worker’s activities 
are “carried out with minimal instruction” and with “little direction” 
contributes to a finding that a worker is an independent contractor under 
the statute.147  The second prong of the test concerns whether the work 
done is “outside the usual course of the business.”148  Factors considered 
under the second part of the test include whether the work performed is 
“necessary to the business” of the employer or is “merely incidental;”149 
and a business’ self-described purpose or mission.150  The second prong is 
the most litigated of the three, disputes often arising over what constitutes 
an employer’s “usual course of business.”151  Finally, the “critical inquiry” 
under the third prong has focused on “whether ‘the worker is capable of 
performing the service to anyone wishing to avail themselves of the 
services or, conversely, whether the nature of the business compels the 
 
144. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B (2019) (emphasis added). 
145. Sebago v. Boston Cab Dispatch, Inc., 28 N.E.3d. 1139, 1146 (Mass. 2015). 
146. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B (2019).  See also Somers v. Converged Access, 
Inc., 911 N.E.2d 739, 750 (Mass. 2009) (“Misclassification not only hurts the individual 
employee; it also imposes significant financial burdens on the Federal government and the 
Commonwealth in lost tax and insurance revenues.  Moreover, it gives an employer who 
misclassifies employees as independent contractors an unfair competitive advantage over 
employers who correctly classify their employees and bear the concomitant financial burden.”). 
147. Sebago, 28 N.E.3d. at 1149. 
148. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B (2019). 
149. Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1150. 
150. Carey v. Gatehouse Media Mass. I, Inc., 94 N.E.3d 420, 429 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018) 
(holding that newspaper delivery drivers employed by publishing company were employees and 
not independent contractors under section 148B because the publishing company had offered 
no evidence of the “actual operations” of the drivers’ work to satisfy the second prong of the 
statute). 
151. Id. (discussing preemption of the second prong of section 148B by the Federal 
Aviation Administration Act of 1994 in a case concerning the employment status of a delivery 
driver employed by a newspaper publisher); Sebago, 28 N.E.3d. at 1150. 
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worker to depend on a single employer for the continuation of the 
services.’”152 
While each of the definitional standards at issue in Camargo appears 
within its own statutory scheme, each does not exist in a vacuum.  Rather 
they form part of a set of remedial laws designed to protect the rights of 
workers.  The following Part will demonstrate the unique challenges 
facing agencies and courts when the relationship between these laws is 
conflicting or ambiguous.  Moreover, this discussion will demonstrate the 
necessity of resolving statutory ambiguities in the interest of furthering 





II.  EMPLOYING A CONTRADICTION: CAMARGO CAUGHT IN A 
“PATCHWORK STATUTORY SCHEME”153 
In Camargo, the SJC examined a decision of the DIA Reviewing 
Board that denied newspaper delivery agent Ives Camargo eligibility for 
workers’ compensation on the grounds that she was not an employee of 
the company that had hired her.154  The language under examination in 
Camargo—found in subsection (d) of section 148B of chapter 149—
contained a reference to chapter 152: 
Whoever fails to properly classify an individual as an employee 
according to this section and in so doing violates chapter 152 [the 
workers’ compensation statute] shall be punished as provided in 
section 14 of said chapter 152 and shall be subject to all of the civil 
remedies, including debarment, provided in section 27C of this 
chapter.155 
Camargo argued that this language suggested that the definition of 
“independent contractor” in section 148B applied to chapter 152, 
contending that the DIA Reviewing Board had erred by using the wrong 
standard in concluding that she was an independent contractor and not an 
employee.156  Rather than resolving the ambiguity regarding the 
 
152. Sebago, 28 N.E.3d. at 1153. 
153. Ives Camargo’s Case, 96 N.E.3d 673, 682 (Mass. 2018). 
154. Id. at 675. 
155. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B(d) (2019) (emphasis added). 
156. Camargo, 96 N.E.3d at 675.  See also Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellant at 9, Ives 
Camargo, 96 N.E.3d 673 (Dec. 21, 2017) (No. 12368), 2017 WL 6943316. 
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application of the “independent contractor” definition, the SJC affirmed 
the Board’s determination, holding that section 148B did not apply to 
workers’ compensation.157  Chief Justice Gants concurred with the 
majority’s conclusion.  Nevertheless, he opined that practical problems 
arise from the current methods for defining employment status in 
Massachusetts.  He suggested that the legislature confront them, rejecting 
a role for the court in resolving a contradictory statutory scheme.158 
This Part will suggest that the court’s holding represents an 
abdication of judicial responsibility that will likely exacerbate the problem 
of worker misclassification in the Commonwealth.  The SJC missed an 
opportunity to clarify and support the remedial purpose of Massachusetts 
workplace laws.  By deferring to agency judgment and assigning the 
problem to the legislature, the SJC failed to act on an issue that the court 
could have resolved, much to the detriment of workers in the 
Commonwealth.  In order to understand the court’s failure to resolve the 
problem in Camargo, this Part will analyze the majority’s reasoning and 
assess the arguments presented in the concurring opinion. 
A.  The Majority’s Cursory Conclusions 
When Camargo appealed the DIA’s decision, the Board considered 
the obvious inconsistencies in Massachusetts workplace laws, citing the 
presumption of employee status as a particular example.159  The Board 
reasoned that because “a worker has the burden of proof to prove her 
employment status, as they do for all workers’ compensation claims,” no 
presumption of employee status exists in chapter 152, and thus section 
148B does not apply.160  The Board dismissed the ambiguous language at 
issue, rejecting the argument that the language had any bearing on 
determining which was the appropriate definitional standard to use for 
deciding worker status in workers’ compensation claims.161  The Board 
further noted that its ruling in Camargo’s case would create a greater 
divide among Massachusetts workplace laws, concluding that “by so 
ruling, three somewhat different tests for independent contractor status are 
discerned in Massachusetts jurisprudence, that being § 148B, G.L. c. 
 
157. Camargo, 96 N.E.3d at 675. 
158. Id. at 681. 
159. Ives Camargo, 30 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. 311, 2016 WL 7335381, at *5 (Mass. 
Dep’t Indus. Accidents Dec. 9, 2016), (observing that workers are presumed to be employees 
under the independent contractor statute and under the state’s unemployment statute). 
160. Id. (citations omitted). 
161. Id. at *5. 
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151A, § 2, and the MacTavish-Whitman factors.”162  On appeal to the SJC, 
Camargo contended that the Board had erred by failing to use 148B in 
defining her status.163—her argument was again rejected.  The SJC 
deferred to the DIA’s and Board’s judgment, holding that 148B did not 
apply to workers’ compensation.164 
The core issue before the SJC was one of statutory interpretation.165  
The court’s analysis, however, is more perfunctory than painstaking.  
First, the court deferred unquestioningly to agency judgment, accepting 
the DIA’s interpretation of chapter 152 and use of the MacTavish-
Whitman factors.166  Second, the court analyzed the ambiguous reference 
to chapter 152 within 148B with the assumption that the two statutes’ 
intents are distinct, failing to consider their common, remedial purpose. 
1. Deference to the DIA 
In general, state167 and federal168 administrative agencies receive 
significant deference from courts.  The Supreme Court recognized the 
deference doctrine in Chevron, which solidified the power of an 
administrative agency to enforce and interpret statutes that fall within its 
legislatively determined enforcement authority.169  When reviewing a 
statute that an agency administers, courts must first determine whether the 
legislative intent of the statute is ambiguous.170  If not, and the legislative 
purpose is clear, then an agency’s statutory construction may stand only 
if expressive of that intent.171  If, however, a reviewing court determines 
the statute is ambiguous, the court may not reject an agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of a statute.172  A similar level of deference is due to an 
 
162. Id. at *4–5. 
163. Ives Camargo’s Case, 96 N.E.3d 673, 675 (Mass. 2018). 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 678. 
166. Id. at 677. 
167. Olmstead v. Dep’t of Telecomms. & Cable, 999 N.E.2d 125, 132 (Mass. 2013) 
(“[W]e give deference to a reasonable interpretation by the agency implementing the 
statute . . . .”); Flemings v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 727 N.E.2d 1147, 1148 (Mass. 2000) 
(“We give great deference to decisions of administrative agencies.”). 
168. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“We 
have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s 
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference 
to administrative interpretations.” (footnote omitted)). 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 842. 
171. Id. at 843. 
172. Id. 
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agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation.173  When 
reviewing an agency’s construction of a statute that does not fall within 
its authority, courts are not required to defer to the agency’s 
interpretation.174 
While agency deference is a well-established doctrine, it has received 
significant criticism, as evidenced by recent state court decisions175  
suggesting that it is not absolute.  Moreover, the Supreme Court limited 
the deference doctrine in a recent decision involving agency regulatory 
construction,176 which upheld the deference doctrine but narrowed its 
application,177 leaving it “potent in its place, but cabined in its scope.”178 
Massachusetts state agencies are given “considerable leeway” to 
interpret and enforce the statutes they are responsible for administering.179  
In Camargo, the DIA’s interpretation of the workers’ compensation law, 
chapter 152, was due—and was given—deference by the SJC.180  
Observing that the twelve-factor MacTavish-Whitman test had been used 
by the agency “for over one-quarter century,” the court underlined the 
test’s validity and emphasized its precedential value.181  Furthermore, the 
court noted that other jurisdictions use similar standards for defining 
 
173. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (holding that an agency’s interpretation 
of its own regulation is controlling unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.” (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 
(1989))). 
174. Id. 
175. See King v. Miss. Military Dep’t, 245 So.3d 404, 407–08 (Miss. 2018) (“[O]ur 
pronouncements on the deference due the agency have not been consistent and, especially in 
recent years, we have backed away from showing ‘great deference’ to agency interpretations of 
statutes. . . .  [W]e announce today that we abandon the old standard of review giving deference 
to agency interpretations of statutes.”). 
176. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
177. The Court clarified agency—particularly Auer—deference in Kisor, noting that 
courts should not simply apply deference indiscriminately.  Instead, courts must only apply the 
doctrine when a regulation is truly ambiguous.  To do this, courts must “exhaust all the 
‘traditional tools’ of construction.”  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415.  Then the reasonableness of the 
agency’s interpretation must be assessed.  Even then, even if an agency’s construction is 
reasonable, deference may only be applied when the “character and context of the agency 
interpretation entitles it to controlling weight,” id. at 2416, and when the regulatory 
interpretation reflects “fair and considered judgment.”  Id. at 2417. 
178. Id. at 2408. 
179. Sy v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 950 N.E.2d 75, 79 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2011) (quoting Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Amesbury v. Housing Appeals Comm’n, 933 N.E.2d 
74 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010)). 
180. Ives Camargo’s Case, 96 N.E.3d 673, 677 (Mass. 2018). 
181. Id. at 676. 
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employment status under workers’ compensation, providing persuasive 
support for the test’s use by the DIA.182 
The SJC declined to consider the reasonableness of the MacTavish-
Whitman test itself, noting conclusively, “[w]e owe deference to the 
department’s interpretation of the definition of employee under G.L. c. 
152.”183  The test was criticized by amici for Camargo as an “unwieldy, 
unclear, lengthy list of factors.”184  The amici noted further that the test 
was developed by the agency as a necessary response to the “vague” 
definition of “employee” under chapter 152.185  As the amici argued, the 
statutory definition of workers’ compensation has been “layered with 
factors imported from the common law through subsequent case law.”186  
The SJC did not analyze the agency’s standard nor consider its 
reasonableness.  Moreover, the court demonstrated judicial hesitation and 
unwavering deference to a test that had only been in use by the DIA for 
twenty-five years when it declined to consider whether the MacTavish-
Whitman test is still workable or should be changed.187  The court 
consequently missed an opportunity to assess whether the MacTavish-
Whitman factors still provide an adequate standard for distinguishing 




183. Id. at 677–78. 
184. Amicus Brief for Appellant at 16, Ives Camargo’s Case, 96 N.E.3d 673 (Dec. 21, 
2017) (No. 12368), http://masscases.com/briefs/sjc/479/479mass492/SJC-
12368_06_Amicus_Brazilian_Women_S_Group_Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NZW-6UEE] 
[hereinafter Camargo’s Brief]. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 22–23. 
187. Multifactor tests like MacTavish-Whitman pose significant challenges to the courts 
and agencies tasked with interpreting them: 
Once a court goes through the complicated and time-consuming process of 
determining which test to use, it must next apply complex tests involving a large 
number of factors.  The tests vary in length and number of factors, ranging from 
the five exclusive factors . . . up to twenty nonexclusive factors . . . .  While the 
factors may vary slightly between tests, many factors within any one test are 
similar and therefore can be overlapping, confusing the courts. . . .  This makes it 
difficult for employers and employees to determine how they should define their 
relationship to be in accordance with the law, and also makes it difficult to generate 
predictable and consistent outcomes if a case is taken to court. 
Pearce & Silva, supra note 80, at 17–18.  See also supra Section I.B. 
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2. Perfunctory Reading of Section 148B 
The SJC’s analysis of section 148B emphasized both the limiting 
nature of the language at issue and the statute’s distinct purpose as 
compared to chapter 152.188  The language of the statute indicated that its 
sole application was “for the purpose of [G.L. c. 149] and [G.L. c.] 151,” 
demonstrating to the court a purposeful exclusion of the workers’ 
compensation statute from its scope.189  The reference to chapter 152 was, 
according to the court, “specific and limited.”190  Furthermore, the court 
misconstrues the reference to chapter 151 in chapter 148B’s 
misclassification penalty provision, concluding that violations of 148B 
and 152 are distinct despite statutory language indicating otherwise.191  
Consequently, the court was satisfied that the Board correctly concluded 
that this language was not intended to replace the standards set by the 
statute and the MacTavish-Whitman factors.192 
The court’s reading of section 148B, too, was “specific and limited.”  
The statute, remedial in nature, is entitled to liberal construction;193 its 
language should be read so as to effectuate the meaning to the whole 
statute rather than concentrate on a word or phrase in isolation.194  Where 
two statutes are unified in purpose or in protecting the same class of 
people, ambiguous language may be read in pari materia195 to discern the 
meaning of an ambiguous term in one statute based “on the meaning that 
 
188. Camargo, 96 N.E.3d at 677 (“General Laws c. 149 provides specific benefits and 
protections to employees, including how often an employee must be paid, when an employee 
must be notified of wage deductions, and how much time an employee must be given for break 
periods during work.”). 
189. Id. at 678. 
190. Id. at 679 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 152, § 1). 
191. The court stated: 
“We do not agree that subsection (d) of § 148B can be interpreted to include [G.L. 
c.] 152 in toto.  The subsection addresses expanded penalties for misclassifying 
workers, not whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor 
for the purpose of workers’ compensation benefits . . . .  The subsection’s 
requirement that a party that misclassifies a worker in violation of § 148B(d) ‘and 
in so doing violates [G.L. c.] 152’ creates two criteria.  The first is the violation of 
§ 148B(d), the second is when that violation also violates [G.L. c.] 152.”   
Id. (quoting Ives Camargo, 30 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. 311, 2016 WL 7335381, at *5 
(Mass. Dep’t. Indus. Accidents Dec. 9, 2016)). 
192. Id. at 679. 
193. Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc., 990 N.E.2d 1054, 1066 (Mass. 2013). 
194. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 691 N.E.2d 929, 932 (Mass. 1998). 
195. Commonwealth v. Smith, 728 N.E.2d 272, 276 (Mass. 2000) (noting that statutes 
are to be read in pari materia “when the two statutes relate to the same class of persons or things 
or share a common purpose.” (citing NORMAND J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION §§ 51.01–03 (5th ed. 1992))). 
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has settled on the same language in [the] other legislation.”196  
Underscoring the remedial nature of the statutes, amici on behalf of 
Camargo emphasized the need for the court’s “liberal interpretation”197 
and “harmonious” reading “consistent with the legislative purpose of 
protecting the rights of employees.”198  The two statutes, the amici argued, 
should be read in pari materia because they “relate to the same class of 
persons or things or share a common purpose.”199  Furthermore, such a 
reading would support the intent of the legislature’s 2004 amendments to 
148B200—including the language in section (d) referencing chapter 152—
which demonstrated an intent to “broaden [its] scope and relevance.”201  
While amici gloss over language in section 148B defining the statute’s 
scope,202 giving primacy to the reference to chapter 152 in section (d),203 
their argument makes an important point: that the two statutes at issue 
share a common purpose and should be read together. 
The SJC, however, summarily dismisses the argument that the two 
statutes should be construed in pari materia.204  The court cites very little 
case law to support its conclusion that the purposes of the statutes are 
distinct.205  The court found that the incongruities in Massachusetts 
workplace laws are intentional, noting that “laws have imposed different, 
and not uniform, definitions of employees and independent 
contractors . . . .  It is thus not uncommon to have competing definitions 
of the same word where the purposes of the respective statutes are 
different.”206  Moreover, “[t]his lack of uniformity also reflects differences 
in the particular laws.”207  The court, however, does not adequately explain 
or cite what those differences are, stating only broadly that each of the 
 
196. Smith, 728 N.E.2d at 276. 
197. Camargo’s Brief, supra note 184, at 21. 
198. Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellant at 7, Ives Camargo, 96 N.E.3d 673 (Dec. 21, 2017) 
(No. 12368), 2017 WL 6943316. 
199. Camargo’s Brief, supra note 184, at 28. 
200. See 2004 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 193 (West). 
201. Camargo’s Brief, supra note 184, at 20. 
202. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B(a) (2019) (“For the purpose of this chapter and 
chapter 151 . . . .”). 
203. Id. § 148B(d) (2018) (“Whoever fails to properly classify an individual as an 
employee according to this section and in so doing violates chapter 152 shall be punished . . . .”). 
204. Camargo’s Brief, supra note 184, at 28. 
205. Ives Camargo’s Case, 96 N.E.3d 673, 680 (Mass. 2018). 
206. Camargo, 96 N.E.3d at 679–80. 
207. Id. at 680. 
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laws where these definitions are found require “complex allocation of 
costs and benefits.”208 
Nor does the court provide much support for its conclusion that 
chapter 152 and section 148B of chapter 149 should not be read in pari 
materia, citing a single case from the Supreme Court of Nevada209 for 
support.  In Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen’s Club, Inc.,210 a group of 
performers at a strip club filed suit against their employer, alleging that 
they were employees and were guaranteed a minimum wage.211  At issue 
were two differing standards to determine worker status under workers’ 
compensation and wage and hour law.212  The Nevada court reasoned that 
the two statutes should not be construed together 
because the underlying purpose of the state’s workers’ compensation 
laws—to wit, to limit “private controversy and litigation between 
employer and employee” and to give workers the right to 
compensation regardless of fault—is distinct from that of the statutory 
minimum wage scheme, which seeks to safeguard the “health and 
welfare of persons required to earn their livings by their own 
endeavors.”213 
Here the Nevada court’s reasoning is no less convincing than the SJC’s, 
their view no less myopic.  The common purpose of the statutes—to 
“safeguard” workers—is given less attention than the distinct means the 
statutes provide to achieve that purpose. 
Both courts fail to address precisely why workers’ compensation is 
so distinct from other workplace laws that it requires a completely 
different definition for “employee” and “independent contractor.”  Other 
courts have similarly struggled to explain the distinct nature of workers’ 
compensation in comparison to other workplace laws, such as wage and 
hour and unemployment.  These courts, like the SJC, hesitate to find 
distinct workplace statutes in pari materia because they “were not enacted 
for precisely the same purpose”214 but rather that they have “a goal similar 
to, but not identical with”215 other workplace laws. 
 
208. Id. 
209. Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen’s Club, 336 P.3d 951 (Nev. 2014). 
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 953. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 957 (citations omitted). 
214. Commonwealth v. Stuber, 822 A.2d 870, 872–73 (Pa. Commw. 2003) (emphasis 
added), aff’d, 859 A.2d 1253 (Pa. 2004). 
215. Id. at 873 (emphasis added). 
 
2020] CASE OF CAMARGO 285 
 
The SJC’s statutory interpretation in Camargo does not adequately 
address the remedial nature of the statutes at issue.  The court ultimately 
concluded that they “need not . . . belabor the similarities or differences in 
the statutes, as it is up to the Legislature to decide how much uniformity 
to impose, and it has done so with care and particularity in these statutory 
schemes.”216  This punting to the legislature demonstrates a failure of the 
court to take judicial responsibility.  If not the court’s, whose duty is to 
“belabor the similarities or differences” of statutes—to interpret their 
meaning?217 
B.   The Concurring Opinion’s Unsolved Problem 
Chief Justice Gants, along with Justices Budd and Lowy—three of 
the seven justices on the court—provided an alternative view of the 
statutory inconsistencies.218  In his concurrence, the Chief Justice 
discusses the “practical consequences” of the Commonwealth’s 
“patchwork statutory scheme” for distinguishing employees from 
independent contractors—namely, “confusion and uncertainty.”219  
Focusing on workers misclassification, the Chief Justice emphasizes the 
need for change.220  Yet, like the majority’s opinion, the concurrence 
declines to take judicial responsibility for the problem before the court, 
instead inviting the legislature to act and address the issue.221 
Inconsistent standards create additional confusion for workers and 
employers alike.222  Determining employment status can be challenging, 
especially given that “under the current law, the same worker can be an 
employee for one purpose but an independent contractor for another.”223  
Such a system ultimately leads to workers being uncertain or unaware of 
their rights under the laws,224 and thus interferes with their ability to assert 
 
216. Ives Camargo’s Case, 96 N.E.3d 673, 680 (Mass. 2018). 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 681 (Gants, J., concurring). 
219. Id. at 681–82. 
220. Id. at 681. 
221. Id. at 683. 
222. Id. at 682. 
223. Id. 
224. Camargo’s Brief, supra note 184, at 4 (“[S]ome workers will never pursue a claim 
at all, not realizing that they have been misclassified, not understanding the protections to which 
they are entitled, or unable to obtain legal assistance to file a claim”).  Even the DIA contributes 
to the confusion, failing to give a straight answer on how the agency determines independent 
contractor status.  The agency’s own guidance skirts the issue, commenting that “[q]uestions 
regarding independent contract coverage will be answered by one of our attorneys.”  MASS. 
DEP’T OF INDUS. ACCIDENTS, MASS. WORKERS’ COMP. SOURCEBOOK & CITATOR PT. 1 
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those rights.225  Additionally, employers can struggle to classify workers 
properly with such an inconsistent statutory scheme,226 increasing the 
likelihood of worker misclassification.227  Chief Justice Gants focuses on 
the real, practical implications of the current definitional standards,228 
which are further complicated by the majority’s holding. 
The concurrence observes “it is time to confront the problems that 
arise from this complex statutory scheme, especially to workers,”229 
underlining the difficulties of the inconsistencies analyzed by the 
majority.  The Chief Justice’s concurrence proffers legitimate policy 
reasons for a consistent means of defining worker status, going further 
than the majority in that regard.  However, like the majority, the 
concurrence does not recognize any judicial role in addressing the 
inconsistencies in the statutory scheme of the Commonwealth’s 
workplace laws, nor in requiring more clarity from an administrative 
agency charged with interpreting that scheme.  Instead, the legislature is 
called to act—to confront the matter the court was so hesitant to.  The 
Chief Justice’s call to the legislature offers potential solutions, discussing 
legislative efforts taken in other states to achieve more harmony in states’ 
approaches to defining employment status.230  No judicial solution is 
proffered or even considered, nor is any discussion of what the court could 
have done to address the issue.  Like the majority’s opinion, the 
concurrence declines to accept any judicial responsibility for the 
Commonwealth’s fractured standards to define who is an “employee” and 
“independent contractor,” notably declining to engage in any critical 
analysis of the DIA’s MacTavish-Whitman factors.231 
In practice, Camargo affirms an inconsistent system that further 
confuses the distinction between “employee” and “independent 
 
(MCLE 2019).  The agency’s website even provides erroneous information, listing section 148B 
as the appropriate standard for determining independent contractor status under workers’ 
compensation despite Camargo’s holding otherwise.  Who is Covered by Workers’ 
Compensation Insurance, MASS. DEP’T OF INDUS. ACCIDENTS, MASS.GOV, 
https://www.mass.gov/service-details/who-is-covered-by-workers-compensation-insurance 
[https://perma.cc/6MLZ-38NK]. 
225. Ives Camargo’s Case, 96 N.E.3d 673, 682 (Mass. 2018) (Gants, C.J., concurring). 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 682–83. 
229. Id. at 683. 
230. Id. (citing Maine’s efforts in passage of a uniform standard for defining 
“independent contractor” as a prime example). 
231. Id. 
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contractor”232—a system allowing for the paradoxical result that a worker 
can at once be an independent contractor under one employment law and 
an employee under another.  By upholding the inconsistencies in the 
current “piecemeal and inconsistent”233 system and failing to resolve 
them, the SJC missed an opportunity to solve a judicially solvable 
problem.  Nevertheless, a solution must be proposed. 
III.  UNIFORMITY OVER PLURALITY: A COMMON DEFINITION OF 
“INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR” IN MASSACHUSETTS 
The proliferation of incongruous tests defining worker status in 
Massachusetts is representative of a pervasive national problem.234  The 
proposed solutions to these definitional challenges are just as varied as the 
different standards.235  Camargo argued her case in favor of uniformity, 
yet the SJC’s holding in Camargo cursorily disregarded her argument, 
maintaining the status quo of plurality among Massachusetts workplace 
laws defining “employee” and “independent contractor.”  Thus, the SJC 
missed an opportunity to read clarity and consistency into the 
Commonwealth’s workplace laws.  However, the problem remains and 
calls for a solution. 
This part of the Note will first consider and evaluate the example of 
one state—Maine—that sought to achieve consistency across its 
workplace laws through legislative amendments.  This Part will then 
propose that Massachusetts uniformly apply the ABC test under 148B in 
order to establish a single definition of “independent contractor” across 
the Commonwealth’s workplace laws.  This would provide consistency in 
determining worker status and thus decrease the risk of worker 
misclassification present in the current statutory scheme. 
A. Harmonizing Worker Classification in Maine 
One approach to the definitional conundrum posed by multiple tests 
for determining worker status has been to harmonize the conflicting 
definitions.  In some instances, this approach has been characterized as a 
“consolidating” approach.236  By substituting multiple worker status tests 
with a single test, the objective is “to reduce horizontal conflicts between 
 
232. See generally id. 
233. Dubal, supra note 59, at 72–73 (discussing the tension between statutory definitions 
and the courts’ use of those definitions in determining worker status). 
234. Id. at 75–76. 
235. Id. at 76. 
236. Miller, supra note 62, at 232. 
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worker status laws . . . significantly reducing the confusion associated 
with applying different tests to different laws.”237  Additionally, this 
approach could be characterized as an effort to “harmonize”238 the 
definitions of “employee” and “independent contractor” in various 
workplace laws in order to decrease the likelihood of misclassification. 
Maine is one state that has sought to harmonize statutory definitions 
of “employee” and “independent contractor” in the interest of 
consistency.239  Maine “has adopted a single, uniform standard for 
determining employment status under unemployment insurance, workers’ 
compensation, and other employment laws.”240  This common 
definition—which is used for the purposes of workers’ compensation,241 
unemployment insurance,242 and in employment practices243—replaces 
the multiple tests previously used . . . and seeks to eliminate the prior 
confusion experienced by businesses when they received different 
determinations as to whether a worker was an employee or independent 
contractor from state agencies enforcing employment laws.”244 
Maine’s efforts at harmonization have focused on the definition of 
“independent contractor” in its workplace law statutes.245  In 2012, the 
legislature passed “An Act to Standardize the Definition of ‘Independent 
Contractor,’”246 which amended the definition of “independent 
contractor,” under Maine’s employment practices law, 247 unemployment 
 
237. Id.  Another state that has taken a more aggressive approach to consolidating and 
harmonizing its statutes is Montana, which “eliminated state horizontal test conflict by adopting 
a single two-part test.”  Id.  Montana’s “employee” test is limited to a set of five workplace 
laws: workers’ compensation, unemployment, wage and hour, human rights, and tax.  Id. at 233.  
While Montana’s approach achieves uniformity, it creates certain conflicts between state and 
federal laws, particularly in the area of taxation.  Id. at 235. 
238. Ives Camargo’s Case, 96 N.E.3d 673, 682 (Mass. 2018). 
239. Id. at 683. 
240. Id. 
241. ME. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 102 (2017). 
242. ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 1043 (2017). 
243. ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 591 (2017). 
244. Employment Standard Defining Employee vs Independent Contractor, BUREAU OF 
LABOR STANDARDS, MAINE DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.maine.gov/labor/misclass/
employment_standard.shtml [https://perma.cc/EHV9-WTCX]. 
245. 2012 Me. Legis. Serv. Ch. 643.  See also Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 53, 
at 73 (“Maine’s change applied only to its workers’ compensation and unemployment insurance, 
but the state made its laws consistent with preexisting standards in other statutes, creating a 
matching standard across all laws.”). 
246. Ch. 643. 
247. ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 591. 
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law,248 and workers’ compensation law.249  Additionally, this act created 
a separate misclassification statute250 establishing a penalty for the 
misclassification of employees as independent contractors in all sectors of 
the labor market.251  The uniform standard is composed of two sets of 
criteria, both of which must be met in order for a worker to be classified 
as an independent contractor.252  The first set of criteria are as follows: 
(a) The individual has the essential right to control the means and 
progress of the work except as to final results; 
(b) The individual is customarily engaged in an independently 
established trade, occupation, profession or business; 
(c) The individual has the opportunity for profit and loss as a result of 
the services being performed for the other individual or entity; 
(d) The individual hires and pays the individual’s assistants, if any, 
and, to the extent such assistants are employees, supervises the details 
of the assistants’ work; and 
(e) The individual makes the individual’s services available to some 
client or customer community even if the individual’s right to do so is 
voluntarily not exercised or is temporarily restricted[.]253 
The second set of factors concern manner of payment, whether the work 
is “outside the usual course of business for which the service is 
performed,” among others. 254  This hybrid test, bearing qualities of both 
the common law of agency test and the economic realities test,255 is less 
simple than the ABC test,256 creating a set of mandatory criteria in place 
of the ABC’s general presumption of employment. 
Maine’s common definition of “independent contractor” also allows 
for greater consistency in handling claims under Maine’s workplace laws.  
The state’s standard independent contractor test creates a set of required 
criteria rather than factors to be weighed for both workers’ 
 
248. ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 1043. 
249. ME. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 102. 
250. ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 591-A. 
251. “An employer that intentionally or knowingly misclassifies an employee as an 
independent contractor commits a civil violation for which a fine of not less than $2,000 and 
not more than $10,000 per violation may be adjudged.”  Id. 
252. 2012 Me. Legis. Serv. Ch. 643. 
253. ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 1043. 
254. Id. 
255. See supra Section I.B.2. 
256. See supra Section I.B.3. 
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compensation257 and unemployment.258  Although the test does not create 
a presumption of employment,259 as the independent contractor statutes of 
other states do (including Massachusetts), an employer seeking to contest 
the these factors have not been met still has the burden of doing so.260  
“The burden of proof is on the employer to establish . . . the relationship 
for purposes of the Act [is] one of ‘employment.’”261  There is a similar 
burden under workers’ compensation law.  However, the workers’ 
compensation law differs from the unemployment law in that it provides 
certain exceptions to employee status in addition to the independent 
contractor test in the statute.262  So the employer, not the employee, must 
carry the burden of establishing that a worker is an independent contractor 
and not an employee. 
Maine’s approach is practical, providing a consistent standard for 
determining worker status under remedial statutes meant to provide 
workers benefits and protections.263  However, its approach is not entirely 
uniform.  Nonetheless, the state’s efforts at harmonization in defining 
worker status across multiple workplace statutes “keep in mind the 
explicit legislative mandate for [the courts] to construe the law liberally in 
favor of the workman.”264 
B. Uniformity Under the ABC Test in Massachusetts 
Camargo’s conundrum demonstrates that Massachusetts must 
combat the incongruities in its workplace laws.265  Maine provides an 
example of efforts to achieve uniformity.266  However, Massachusetts 
 
257. Madore v. Liberty Nat’l Bank, 289 A.2d 36, 38 (Me. 1972) (noting, however, that 
the burden shifts to the worker to prove he is an employee and not an independent contractor 
where there is no history of “regular work under his general employment” with the employer); 
Murray’s Case, 154 A. 352, 353 (Me. 1931). 
258. Sinclair Builders, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 73 A.3d 1061, 1066 (Me. 
2013). 
259. Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 53, at 71. 
260. Sinclair, 73 A.3d at 1066. 
261. Id. 
262. ME. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 102 (2019). 
263. Miller, supra note 62, at 232–35 (noting that in choosing “between a state tax test 
that is uniform with other state laws but inconsistent with federal tax law, and a state tax test 
that is uniform with federal tax law but inconsistent with other state tests[, n]either is ideal, but 
the latter is preferable.”). 
264. In re Dudley, 256 A.2d 592, 594 (Me. 1969). 
265. See supra Part II. 
266. See supra Section III.A. 
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could realize even greater consistency by applying the ABC test uniformly 
across the Commonwealth’s workplace laws. 
Maine provides one common definition of “independent contractor” 
for the purposes of workers’ compensation and unemployment 
insurance.267  Massachusetts should consider a similar path.  However, 
Maine’s definition of “independent contractor” differs from 
Massachusetts’s definition.  In Massachusetts, the definition of 
“independent contractor” under section 148B, an ABC test, establishes 
presumption of employee status.268  Statutory presumption of employment 
can “root out common misclassification tactics.”269  As such, 
“presumption could be a powerful tool for realigning the interests of 
workers and subcontractors and for protecting the interests of workers 
without placing the burden of asserting such claims on their shoulders 
alone.”270  In essence, worker status statutes that presume workers to be 
employees are more protective of workers: 
Irrespective of variations in the substantive standards applied to 
overcome it, the presumption effectively shifts the burden for 
establishing a legitimate independent contracting relationship from 
the worker to the employer.  By placing the onus on employers to 
proactively establish their workers as independent contractors, the 
presumption transforms the assessment of independent contracting 
status.271 
Rather than adopting the criteria of Maine’s definition, the Massachusetts 
legislature should keep the current ABC test under section 148B, the 
Massachusetts independent contractor statute.  However, the legislature 
should extend the ABC test to define worker status across all workplace 
laws.  This includes chapter 152, the Massachusetts workers’ 
compensation law, where no presumption of employee status exists but 
for a few excepted circumstances within the statute.272  This would create 
a uniform definition of independent contractor across the 
Commonwealth’s workplace laws. 
This suggestion is supported by the fact that the Commonwealth’s 
current statutory scheme creates an unfair imbalance relating to the 
presumption of employment, as the presumption exists under the 
 
267. See supra Section II.A. 
268. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B (2019). 
269. Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 53, at 72. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. at 71. 
272. See supra Section I.B. 
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unemployment statute and in section 148B but does not under chapter 152.  
As the amicus brief filed on behalf of the claimant in Camargo points out, 
there is a lack of harmony and thus consistency in the current statutory 
scheme because of this distinction.273  The amici argue that “[e]xtending 
this presumption to c. 152, along with the substantive test contained in 
c. 149, § 148B is not inconsistent with the history of the workers’ 
compensation law and would harmonize the statutes in keeping with their 
purpose.”274 
There are several counterarguments to this approach.  First, a uniform 
definition of “employee” could lead to over-inclusivity,275 meaning that 
more workers may be misclassified as employees and therefore receive 
the benefits and protections reserved for employees.  On the other hand, 
the ABC test has been criticized for its lack of flexibility, a consequence 
due in part to its simplicity.276  Its three prongs have been considered 
“[]friendly to judges, workers, and businesses compared to the 
complexity”277 of the current alternatives.  At the same time, the test is 
“deceptively simple,” its practical application demonstrating its 
rigidity.278  Ultimately, the legislative purpose of workplace laws is to 
ensure workers are protected.279  The interest in serving that legislative 
purpose should outweigh the interest in avoiding the potential for over-
inclusivity. 
However, some legitimate policy reasons exist for maintaining 
different definitions due to the distinct differences of various workplace 
laws.280  In Camargo, for example, the majority explains that 
[the] lack of uniformity [ ] reflects differences in the particular laws.  
The laws governing workers’ compensation, unemployment 
insurance, minimum wages, and tax withholding serve different, albeit 
related, purposes.  Each involves a complex allocation of costs and 
benefits for individuals, companies, and State government itself.281 
 
273. Camargo’s Brief, supra note 184, at 16. 
274. Id. at 8–9. 
275. Sunshine, supra note 53, at 236. 
276. Pearce & Silva, supra note 80, at 28–29. 
277. Id. at 28. 
278. Id. at 29. 
279. See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Regulation by Amicus: The Department of 
Labor’s Policy Making in the Courts, 65 Fla. L. Rev. 1223, 1278 (2013). 
280. Miller, supra note 62, at 232 (observing that “[f]or example, policy makers may 
view discriminatory labor practices differently than tax collection responsibilities, thus creating 
a more expansive test for the former.”). 
281. Ives Camargo’s Case, 96 N.E.3d 673, 680 (Mass. 2018). 
 
2020] CASE OF CAMARGO 293 
 
Nonetheless, the court fails to adequately explain both this “complex 
allocation” and the justification for the plurality of standards.282  
Furthermore, there is some scholarly support for the assertion that the 
“uniformity that the ABC Test can bring to the definitions across all 
relevant laws [can] help provide consistent expectations that are simpler 
to comply with for employers and workers.”283 
The advantages of providing different definitions of worker status in 
different workplace laws “must be weighed against the benefit of easy 
application” of those laws.284  Even in the presence of legitimate policy 
concerns, the policy of maintaining fairness to workers should outweigh 
the policy reasons in favor of facilitating administrative ease for state 
governments and employers.  Camargo clearly demonstrates the lack of, 
and need for, “easy application” of the Commonwealth’s current tests for 
determining who is an “employee” and who is an “independent 
contractor,”285 which makes the risk of misclassification, and thus the risk 
to workers, far higher than it should be. 
CONCLUSION 
Camargo is a missed opportunity for the SJC.  By deferring to agency 
judgment and declining to take judicial responsibility, the SJC has 
endorsed and affirmed a fractured system whereby “the same worker can 
be an employee for one purpose but an independent contractor for 
another.”286  The court failed to clarify the incongruities of the current 
standards, assigning the problem to the legislature.  The impact of the 
Camargo decision will likely be significant, workers’ access to and 
understanding of their benefits likely to decrease; instances of 
misclassification likely to increase.  Nevertheless, a path forward must be 
paved.  The uniform application of the ABC test across the 
Commonwealth’s workplace laws provides a path forward—a way to 
ensure the Commonwealth’s workers are better protected than the current 
“patchwork” system allows. 
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